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INTRODUCTION

Like much of the debate over medical marijuana, the popular
1
response to the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Raich v. Ashcroft
2
has focused largely on drug policy and criminal justice issues.
Meanwhile, the discussion among legal academics revolves around
broad Commerce Clause questions such as the role of the “broader
regulatory scheme” doctrine, the meaning of Wickard after Lopez,
and the place of the traditional state interest inquiry in Commerce
3
Clause jurisprudence. The Supreme Court’s consideration of the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Raich, which held unconstitutional the
Controlled Substances Act as applied to four medical marijuana
patients and caregivers, will undoubtedly have the most immediate
and dramatic impact in these two areas. But the case also frames
an important and more specific question about the relationship
between federal and state powers over health care: the extent to
which health care activity should be regulated by state and local,
rather than federal, government.
This article considers to what extent health care may be viewed
as a traditional area of state concern in the context of the Supreme
Court’s revival of federalism principles, in particular limits on
Congress’ Commerce Clause power, and what effect Raich v.
4
Ashcroft, heard by the Court in the fall 2004 term, might have on
these issues. Addressing these questions will necessarily involve
exploration of medical marijuana policy as well as the role of the
“traditional state interest” principle within the Commerce Clause.
However, the central focus of this article is not what impact Raich
may have on the Commerce Clause or our nation’s drug laws, but
what effect it might have on health care issues.
We start by briefly examining medical marijuana in Part II: the
debate over its efficacy, regulatory history, and current trends in
5
both cultural and legal spheres. We then review the Court’s recent
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, with a focus on the role of the
1. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (U.S. June 28,
2004) (No. 03-1454).
2. See, e.g., Patrick Hoge, 2 Moms who Need Marijuana Await Supreme Court
Ruling - Forced to Challenge Feds to Keep Their Healing Remedy, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 19,
2004, at B1.
3. See, e.g., Marcus Green, Note, Guns, Drugs, and Federalism: Rethinking
Commerce-Enabled Regulation of Mere Possession, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543 (2004).
4. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
2909 (U.S. June 28, 2004) (No. 03-1454).
5. See infra Part II.
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traditional state interest factor in the analysis, and provide an
6
overview of Raich. In Part IV, we provide a historical look at the
traditional role of states in regulating health care and compare that
7
with the more recent expansion of federal health care regulation.
Part V then provides an overview and examples of how the
traditional state interest issue may impact future health care
8
regulation in four different fields.
II. MEDICAL MARIJUANA
In the wake of California’s 1996 medical marijuana ballot
initiative, the issue has enjoyed a resurgence in mainstream news
coverage. Similar ballot initiatives have appeared regularly since
1996. In 2004, Montana voters became the latest to pass a medical
9
marijuana initiative. Although the interest in medical marijuana is
recent, marijuana has been used as a medicine in the United States
10
since at least the middle of the 1800s. In parts of Asia and Africa,
the plant has been used medicinally for thousands of years, to treat
11
ailments from malaria to headaches.
Today, medical marijuana proponents cite evidence that it is
effective in treating patients who suffer from a number of
conditions, including HIV/AIDS, multiple sclerosis, cancer, and
12
glaucoma. Medical marijuana helps these patients by effectively
13
treating pain, nausea and wasting, muscle spasms, and seizures.
Because it is nearly impossible for non-government researchers to
14
conduct studies of marijuana’s efficacy as a medicine, anecdotal
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. Medical Marijuana Act, Montana Laws Init. Meas. 148 (2004) (passed
Nov. 2, 2004, effective Jan. 1, 2005).
10. See LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN
MEDICINE 4-7 (1997) (discussing the early studies in the United States of marijuana
as a medicine).
11. Id. at 3.
12. Brief of The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society, Pain Relief Network,
California Medical Association, AIDS Action Council, Compassion in Dying
Federation, End-of-Life Choices, National Women’s Health Network, Global
Lawyers and Physicians, and Autonomy, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 10-17, Ashcroft v. Raich, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004) (No. 03-1454)
[hereinafter Lymphoma Society Brief].
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Marcella Bombardieri & Jenna Russell, Pot Project Wins Support,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 2, 2003, at A.28 (showing the resolution of a research request
from a professor at the University of Massachusetts was still unclear despite
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evidence necessarily provides the basis for some of these claims.
But, recent comprehensive studies commissioned by the United
States and the Great Britain House of Lords both support the
conclusion that marijuana is a useful medicine for at least some
patients.
The United States report was commissioned in 1997, largely in
response to California’s medical marijuana law, and was conducted
by the National Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of
16
Sciences (IOM).
The resulting year-long study of relevant
scientific literature, in consultation with experts from a variety of
fields, gave a qualified recommendation of medical marijuana,
concluding that “[s]cientific data indicate the potential therapeutic
value of cannabinoid drugs, primarily THC, for pain relief, control
17
of nausea and vomiting, and appetite stimulation.” The House of
Lords study concluded that marijuana had “genuine medical
18
applications” in treating similar problems. In addition to being
an effective treatment for a number of conditions, marijuana is a
relatively safe and “benign” medicine in terms of side effects and
19
potential toxicity.
Marijuana was widely thought to have value as a medicine even
when the first anti-marijuana laws were passed. The American
Medical Association (AMA) cautioned against passage of the first
20
federal regulation of marijuana, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,
because it believed the Act would make impossible research into
21
and use of marijuana as a medicine. The AMA’s position was not

receiving support from both of Massachusetts’ senators).
15. See generally GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10 (including stories from
individual patients in addressing the potential benefits of marijuana as a
medicine).
16. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE
BASE 1 (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309071550/html.
17. Id. at 4.
18. SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NINTH REPORT, CANNABIS:
THE SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE (Nov. 4, 1998), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldselect/ldsctech/151/151
01.htm.
19. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10, at 137-54.
20. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, Ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551,
repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, § 1101, 84 Stat. 1236, 1292.
21. See RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA
CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 164-73
(1974) (discussing the congressional testimony of an AMA representative during
consideration of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937).
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surprising, given that at the time marijuana was included in the
United States Pharmacopeia, a comprehensive list of medicinal
22
substances recognized in the United States.
The Act
distinguished between medical and non-medical uses of
23
marijuana, but the distinction was irrelevant as a practical matter
because the Act functioned in such a way as to “effectively
criminaliz[e] the possession of marijuana throughout the United
24
States.”
The Marihuana Tax Act, which was declared
25
unconstitutional in 1969, had the effect of eliminating any use of
26
marijuana as a medicine for thirty years, and knowledge of
marijuana’s value as a medicine slipped from public and
professional consciousness.
By 1970, when Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act
27
(CSA), marijuana was thought of as a symbol of the youth
28
counter-culture, not a medicine. The CSA organized drugs by
Schedule, I-IV: Schedule I substances have a high potential for
abuse and no accepted medical use, while Schedule IV substances
have a low potential for abuse, an accepted medical use, and are
29
unlikely to cause addiction. Marijuana was provisionally placed in
Schedule I, pending recommendations and findings from a
30
Presidential Commission created by the Act.
The Commission
ultimately urged that marijuana be decriminalized, with penalties
31
President
removed for all personal marijuana-related activity.
Nixon rejected the recommendation, leaving marijuana a Schedule
22. Marijuana was listed in the Pharmacopeia until 1941. GRINSPOON &
BAKALAR, supra note 10, at 8.
23. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, § 7(a)(2), 50 Stat. at 554.
24. ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAPER LABOR IN THE
AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 20 (2003); see also GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10,
at 8 (discussing the difficulties physicians who wished to use medical marijuana in
treating patients faced under the Act); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969)
(discussing in some detail the structure of the Marihuana Tax Act in the context
of recreational use of marijuana and holding the Act unconstitutional as violative
of the Fifth Amendment).
25. Leary, 395 U.S. 6.
26. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 21, at 165.
27. Controlled Substance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801-904) (2000).
28. See DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS
OF FAILURE 7-8 (1997) (discussing marijuana as a symbol of the counter-culture).
The CSA passed in a politically charged atmosphere as part of President Nixon’s
effort to crack down on crime and lawlessness. Id. at 13-17.
29. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 21, at 245.
30. Id. at 246-47.
31. Id. at 270.
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32

I drug.
Independent of the increased federal effort against drug use,
the idea of marijuana as a medicine began to gain traction again in
the mid-1960s and early 1970s as the increase in recreational use
led some users to accidentally stumble upon marijuana’s medicinal
33
value. At the same time, marijuana reform activists began to seize
on the prohibition of medicinal use of marijuana as an example of
34
the excesses of the drug war. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
the new interest in medical marijuana translated into passage of
35
medical marijuana laws in thirty-three states. These early medical
marijuana laws were quite different from the recent efforts: instead
of expressly permitting medical marijuana use and distribution
under state law in violation of the CSA, most established programs
allow use only when approved by the federal government as part of
36
the FDA’s Investigative New Drug (IND) program.
INDs were
generally used by pharmaceutical companies for research projects
but, due to pressure from medical marijuana patients, the federal
government allowed limited medical marijuana use under a
37
“Compassionate IND” program.
The Compassionate IND program stopped permitting new
38
applications in 1992 with thirteen qualified patients.
Those
patients were grandfathered in and the remaining patients still
receive medical marijuana from the federal government, but the
end of the program signaled to activists that medical marijuana
39
efforts at the federal level had hit a wall. In 1996, modern state

32. Id. at 273.
33. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10, at 13.
34. See, e.g., PATRICK ANDERSON, HIGH IN AMERICA: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND
NORML AND THE POLITICS OF MARIJUANA, 236-248 (1981) (discussing medical
marijuana patients involvement in the marijuana law reform movement).
35. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10, at 17.
36. See Nicole Dogwill, Comment, The Burning Question: How Will the United
States Deal with the Medical-Marijuana Debate?, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 247, 256-67
(1997).
37. See generally ROBERT C. RANDALL & ALICE M. O’LEARY, MARIJUANA RX: THE
PATIENTS’ FIGHT FOR MEDICINAL POT 104-12 (1998) (discussing the origins of the
Compassionate IND program).
38. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10, at 20-23.
39. An unsuccessful twenty-two year-long effort to have marijuana
rescheduled through an administrative rule-making procedure also contributed to
the belief among medical marijuana activists that they should turn their attention
to the states. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (denying a petition for review of the Administrator’s final order
maintaining classification of marijuana as narcotic drug under Schedule I).
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law medical marijuana reform efforts began with the passage of
40
Proposition 215, California’s Compassionate Use Act, and a
41
similar ballot initiative in Arizona.
Although a total of eleven states have passed medical
42
marijuana laws since 1996, California’s law has been at the center
of most of the medical marijuana-related publicity and legal
activity, in part because of the structure of California’s law and in
part because local officials have been so direct in embracing and
assisting patients who use marijuana. In addition to permitting use
and possession of marijuana by qualified patients, California’s law
43
allows designated caregivers to grow marijuana for patients.
Although California state courts have held that this provision does
44
not allow for operation of medical marijuana dispensaries, custom
and support from state and local officials have allowed such
businesses and non-profit collectives to operate legally and openly
45
under state law.
Many California cities have gone further than tacit approval of
medical marijuana dispensaries to outright and vocal support. In
Santa Cruz, for example, city officials organized an event to
distribute marijuana on the steps of city hall in response to a DEA
46
raid of a local medical marijuana hospice in September 2002.
Oakland has implemented a system to officially approve and
regulate its medical marijuana clubs after a large number of clubs
sprang up in an area of downtown Oakland that many began
referring to it as “Oaksterdam” in reference to Amsterdam, where

40. Compassionate Use Act of 1996 § 1, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11362.5 (West Supp. 2003).
41. See Elvia Diaz, Medical Marijuana Debate Flares, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 20,
2002, at 7B (discussing the Arizona measure and the state legislature’s subsequent
efforts to repeal it).
42. See National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws, State by State
Laws, at http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=4516 (last visited Feb. 12,
2005) (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington).
43. Compassionate Use Act of 1996 § 1, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11362.5(d).
44. People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 31 (Ct. App. 1997).
45. See, e.g., Jason Hoppin, Pot Clubs Find a New Venue, THE RECORDER, June 7,
2002, at 1 (noting that San Francisco Supervisor Mark Leno urged local law
enforcement officials not to cooperate with federal law enforcement agencies
enforcing federal drug laws).
46. Maria Alicia Gaura & Matthew B. Stannard, Santa Cruz Officials to Defy Feds,
Hand out Medical Pot at City Hall, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 2002 at A23.
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47

marijuana is legal.
The city of Oakland also supported the Oakland Cannabis
Buyer’s Cooperative (OCBC) as it litigated the first medical
marijuana case to reach the Supreme Court. When the federal
government first sought to close OCBC down, Oakland declared a
48
city-wide health emergency in response.
The government
attempted to shut down OCBC by requesting an injunction from a
United States District Court, which subsequently granted the
49
motion.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a medical
50
necessity defense would likely apply to protect OCBC’s activity.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that medical
necessity was not a valid defense to the manufacture and
51
distribution of marijuana. The Court explicitly reserved the issue
of “whether the Controlled Substances Act exceeds Congress’
52
power under the Commerce Clause.”
A. State Interest and the Commerce Clause
The Ninth Circuit reached its decision in Raich because of two
Supreme Court cases that fundamentally changed Commerce
53
Clause jurisprudence: United States v. Lopez and United States v.
54
Morrison. The last time the Supreme Court held a federal action
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause before Lopez, was
55
1936. At the time, a majority of the Court adhered to a restrictive
approach focused on whether an activity had “direct” or “indirect”
56
effects on interstate commerce. Under the “direct-indirect” test,
the Court struck down a number of important pieces of President
Roosevelt’s New Deal.
Roosevelt considered the issue so
problematic that he threatened a court-packing plan to gain a
47. See, e.g., Henry K. Lee, OAKLAND, Closed Pot Club Sues City, Council Broke
up Cluster of Clubs in “Oaksterdam,” S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 2004, at B5.
48. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1114
(9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rev’d, 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
49. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1106 (N.C.
Cal. 1998).
50. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d at 1114.
51. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 493
(2001).
52. Id. at 495 n.7.
53. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
54. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
55. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
56. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 54849 (1935).
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majority of Justices who believed the Constitution permitted a
57
broader federal regulatory power.
In this setting, the Supreme Court dramatically changed
course in 1937 and again in 1942. Although the 1937 case, NLRB v.
58
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., marked the shift, the 1942 case,
59
Wickard v. Filburn, famously demonstrated the extent to which the
Court would allow Congress to regulate activity under the
Commerce Clause. In Wickard, the Court allowed the regulation of
a wheat farmer who exceeded his acreage allotment for personal
uses under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which aimed
60
to stabilize the price of wheat. The Court reasoned that although
the wheat farmer’s individual impact on commerce was
insignificant, the effect of all such farmers’ level of growth was
61
dramatic in the aggregate. The aggregation principle seemed so
sweeping that most regarded commerce power limits as
62
nonexistent.
Both Lopez and Morrison, by a five Justice majority, placed new
constraints on congressional commerce power by holding
respectively unconstitutional a law that criminalized gun possession
in a school zone and a law that provided a private cause of action
63
under federal law for victims of gender-motivated violent acts.
Together, these two cases announced a new framework for
analyzing Commerce Clause challenges based on “three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
64
commerce power:” “the use of the channels of interstate
commerce,” “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” and
65
“those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”
Lopez, Morrison, and most subsequent lower court cases, including

57. See generally Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR’s Court
Plan, 61 YALE L.J. 791 (1952) (discussing the court-packing plan).
58. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding congressional power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause extends to labor relations).
59. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding commerce power extends to intrastate
farming activities).
60. Id. at 114.
61. Id. at 127-28 (consuming homegrown wheat causes variable factor in
maintenance of government regulation of commodity).
62. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 691
(1995) (referring to the Court’s pre-Lopez approach to the Commerce Clause as an
“intellectual joke”).
63. 514 U.S. at 549; 529 U.S. at 598.
64. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
65. Id. at 558-59.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 7
7KREITMARCUS.DOC

966

3/13/2005 4:08:28 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

Raich, have involved the substantial effects category, which covers
activity that may technically be intrastate but nonetheless has a
66
substantial impact on interstate commerce. In Lopez, the Court
identified Wickard as an example of a case that pushed the limits of
67
the substantial effects category.
The central consideration in determining the constitutionality
of a regulation or governmental action within the substantial
effects category is whether the activity regulated is commercial
68
(economic) or noncommercial (noneconomic) in nature. This
was the primary basis that the Court used to distinguish Wickard
from Lopez. The Court argued that the Gun Free School Zones Act
(GFSZA) at issue in Lopez was not a proper exercise of Congress’
commerce power because the Act “by its terms has nothing to do
with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however
69
broadly one might define those terms.” In Morrison, the Court
70
went on to establish a controlling four-factor test. In addition to
the commercial factor, the test considers whether the effect of the
activity on commerce is attenuated; whether the statute contains an
express jurisdictional element that limits its reach; and whether
there are any Congressional findings on the relationship between
the activity and interstate commerce contained in the statute or its
71
legislative history.
Although Morrison’s four-factor test is indisputably the proper
method for resolving challenges to congressional commerce power,
it is also deceptively simple in glossing over some of the
fundamental problems the Court left unanswered in Lopez and
Morrison. For example, the test does not account for the “broader
72
regulatory scheme” doctrine mentioned in Lopez and is neutral on

66. See id. at 558-59 (providing an overview of the three categories of activity).
67. Id. at 559-60 (discussing Wickard, Hodel, McClung, and Heart of Atlanta
Motel as examples “[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce”).
68. Id. at 559-61.
69. Id. at 561.
70. 529 U.S. at 598.
71. Id. at 610-12.
72. See Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46
VILL. L. REV. 1325 (2001) (arguing that the broader scheme doctrine may create
perverse incentives for Congress to regulate more, not less, broadly); Alex Kreit,
Why is Congress Still Regulating Noncommercial Activity?, 28 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
169 (2004) (noting that the Court left unresolved the meaning of the broader
scheme doctrine in Lopez and Morrison and proposing an interpretation of it based
on the enterprise concept).
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even the most fundamental question of whether as-applied
73
Similarly, the
Commerce Clause challenges are allowed at all.
four-factor test does not directly account for perhaps the most
important guiding principle in both Lopez and Morrison: federal
74
encroachment on “traditional state interests.” For our purposes,
the potential for Raich to impact health care law lies in the
75
“traditional state interest” consideration.
In addition to issues
strictly related to Commerce Clause jurisprudence, such as how the
traditional state interest analysis relates to the Morrison test, Raich
presents the Court with questions about the extent to which health
care is a traditional state interest and what that classification may
mean as a practical matter.
In Lopez, the majority explained that when Congress
improperly expands its commerce power, “it effects a ‘change in
the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
76
jurisdiction.’”
The Court reasoned that limiting Congress’
commerce power was necessary to preserve this relationship.
“Under the theories that the Government presents in support of
[finding the GFSZA constitutional], it is difficult to perceive any
limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States historically have been
77
sovereign.” Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lopez relied
78
even more vigorously on federalism concerns. Kennedy argued
that because the GFSZA concerned schools, which traditionally
were a matter for local control, the Court had “a particular duty to
79
ensure that the federal-state balance is not destroyed.” Indeed,
Justice Kennedy appears to view federalism as the central
consideration in Commerce Clause cases: “we must inquire
73. Compare United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Trott, J. dissenting) (concluding that the majority should not have the option of
declaring a statute invalid “as applied”) with United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d
1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003) (debating whether there can be successful as-applied
Commerce Clause challenges or only facial challenges).
74. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 MO. L. REV. 389, 391
(2003) (discussing Lopez and Morrison as cases in which the Court used “federalism
as an independent limitation on congressional power to legislate in areas that
infringe on state sovereignty” but arguing against as-applied commerce
challenges).
75. See Part III infra.
76. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (quoting United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S.
396, 411-12 (1973)).
77. Id. at 564.
78. Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 581.
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whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an
area of traditional state concern . . . . [The GFSZA] forecloses the
States from experimenting and exercising their own judgment in
80
an area to which States lay claim by right of history and expertise.”
In Morrison, the Court emphasized similar themes to explain its
decision. In striking down part of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), the Court stated that “we can think of no better example
of the police power, which the Founders denied the National
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of
81
violent crime and vindication of its victims.”
The Morrison
majority argued that allowing regulation of this sort of local activity
was improper because “[t]he Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local . . . . [This
would permit regulation of] family law and other areas of
traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage,
divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly
82
significant.”
The idea of protecting traditional state authority from federal
intrusion in the context of Lopez and Morrison has its roots in some
of the Court’s Tenth Amendment cases decided in between the
1960s and 1980s, while the Court’s Commerce Clause approach
remained broadly permissive. The legal theory at issue in these
cases was that the Tenth Amendment acted as an affirmative
protection against federal regulation of state-run entities under the
Commerce Clause. The theory was adopted only briefly in National
83
League of Cities v. Usery after being first explored in Justice
84
Douglas’ dissenting opinion in Maryland v. Wirtz.
Under this
theory, States were protected from the increasingly expansive scope
of federal power by preventing the enforcement of otherwise
constitutional regulations against state-run entities. As Usery
explained, “the dispositive factor is that Congress has attempted to
exercise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum
wages and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their

80. Id. at 580, 583.
81. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
82. Id. at 617-18, 615-16.
83. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
84. 392 U.S. 183, 201-05 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery,
426 US. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth. 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
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85

capacities as sovereign governments.” The Court abandoned this
86
reading of the Tenth Amendment just ten years after Usery, but
the principle informs the Court’s focus on traditional state
authority in its new Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Importantly, while Lopez and Morrison draw from themes in the
Tenth Amendment cases, the question of state authority functions
quite differently in each setting. In the Tenth Amendment cases, it
was used to provide certain state action immunity from otherwise
valid federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. In the new
Commerce Clause analysis, it affects the validity of the regulation
itself, whether applied to a state actor or private individuals. At the
same time, however, Lopez and Morrison do not carve out separate
87
spheres of federal and state authority.
While Lopez and Morrison noted that education and criminal
law were traditional state interests as important considerations,
their holdings certainly do not prevent the federal government
entirely, or even largely, from regulating in those areas. This
much, however, is clear: Lopez and Morrison both relied heavily on
the traditional role of states to support their conclusions, though
both left the counters of the traditional state interest inquiry largely
undefined. Neither case specifies what role the factor should play
in analyzing Commerce Clause cases even as both demonstrate it
88
was important to the Court’s decisions.
More fundamentally,
neither case explains what a traditional state interest is. Perhaps
the best indication of the role the concern might play comes in the
idea expressed in Justice Kennedy’s Lopez concurrence that
protecting traditional state authority is especially important when
89
failing to do so would foreclose experimentation by the states.
Nevertheless, the precise role the traditional state interest will play
in Commerce Clause analysis generally, and in Raich specifically,
remains unclear in many key ways. At the same time, it is the
doctrinal mechanism that lies in the middle of the relationship
between Raich and broader health care issues.

85. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852.
86. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
87. See Part III infra (exploring how authority in health care law is
overlapping).
88. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599.
89. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568.
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B. Ashcroft v. Raich
Raich marks the second time in four years that the Supreme
90
Court is faced with the issue of medical marijuana. Raich comes to
the Court on appeal from a 2-1 Ninth Circuit decision holding that
the CSA is likely unconstitutional as applied to “the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for
personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in
91
accordance with state law.”
The case arose in August 2002 when the DEA sent agents to
92
the home of Diane Monson.
They were accompanied by
members of the Butte County Sheriffs Department and the local
93
Talks between the authorities and Monson
district attorney.
lasted three hours before the DEA proceeded to tear down the six
94
marijuana plants growing in her house. Monson had been using
marijuana upon the recommendation of her doctor to help treat a
95
number of chronic illnesses.
After the raid, Monson became
concerned she would not be able to obtain the strain of marijuana
96
that best treated her pains.
She soon located Angel McClary Raich, one of the fourteen
medical marijuana patients represented by the OCBC in United
97
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative.
Raich has used
medicinal cannabis since 1997 for eating, muscle, and nervous
98
system disorders. Unlike Monson, Raich was not able to grow her
90. In 2001, the Supreme Court found the Controlled Substance Act did not
permit a medical necessity defense to marijuana possession. United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op, 532 U.S. 483, 495 (2001). In 2003, the Court let
stand a Ninth Circuit ruling that physicians have a First Amendment right to
recommend marijuana to their patients. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied 72 U.S.L.W. 3092 (Oct. 14, 2003) (No. 03-40).
91. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003).
92. See Decl. of Diane Monson in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 4
[hereinafter Monson Decl.], Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal.
2003)
(No.
02-4872
EMC),
available
at
http://raich-vashcroft.com/raichashdiane.pdf. None of the facts of the case are disputed by
either party. See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1225-26.
93. Monson Decl., supra note 92, at 4.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 3-4.
96. Id. at 4.
97. See generally 532 U.S. 483. See also Decl. of Angel McClary Raich in Supp.
of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 18-19 [hereinafter Raich Decl.], Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F.
Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C 02-4872 EMC), available at
http://www.angeljustice.org/downloads/raichashangel.pdf.
98. See Raich Decl., supra note 97, at 1-17.
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99

own marijuana. In 1998 she became a member of the Oakland
100
When the Cooperative lost its
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative.
101
case in the Supreme Court, Raich had to find alternative sources.
She found two suppliers who generously agreed to provide her
102
marijuana free of charge.
Raich, Monson, and the two suppliers, who remain anonymous
to protect Raich’s medical supply, brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California. They sought
a declaratory judgment that the CSA is unconstitutional as applied
103
to patients using non-purchased intrastate marijuana
under
104
They also sought a
California’s Compassionate Use Act.
preliminary injunction to prevent the federal government from
seizing or destroying their cannabis, or from prosecuting for the
105
use or production of marijuana for the duration of the case.
In addition to their Commerce Clause argument, Raich and
Monson made arguments based on the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
106
Amendments, but the Ninth Circuit did not reach any of these
107
issues.
The District Court found it was unlikely the plaintiffs
108
would succeed on the merits and refused to issue an injunction.
It found dispositive the Ninth Circuit’s previous rulings that the
109
CSA was a permissible exercise of Commerce Clause authority.
The District Court relied on two Ninth Circuit decisions that
rejected Commerce Clause challenges by defendants whom were
110
charged with marijuana possession and distribution offenses.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Visman and Tisor,
99. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2003).
100. Raich Decl., supra note 97, at 18.
101. Id. at 19.
102. Id.
103. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 922-26.
104. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5.
105. Complaint at 12-13, Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (No. 02-4872 EMC), available at http://raich-v-ashcroft.com/
raichashcmp.pdf.
106. Plaintiffs’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 6-24, Raich v.
Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 02-4872 EMC), available at
http://raich-v-ashcroft.com/raichashmem.pdf.
107. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227. Although interesting arguments, it is beyond the
scope of this article to deal with the other constitutional challenges. The crux of
the case relates to the Commerce Clause challenge, and the Ninth Circuit ruled
only upon this issue. Id.
108. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
109. Id. at 923-26.
110. Id. at 924-25 (citing United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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the two cases relied upon by the district court, on the grounds that
111
The court noted
they involved non-medical commercial activity.
that in order to properly conduct analysis under the Commerce
112
Clause, the class of activities must be defined.
The class of
activities associated with Visman and Tisor was drug trafficking, not
113
intrastate non-commercial medical use.
The Ninth Circuit
concluded that drug trafficking is an economic enterprise relating
directly to the CSA’s regulatory purpose of controlling the
114
commercial marijuana market.
In contrast, the court held that
the intrastate non-commercial production and personal use of
marijuana upon a doctor’s recommendation, and in connection
115
with state law, is not a market-based activity.
Thus, the court
stated “concern regarding users’ health and safety is significantly
different in the medicinal marijuana context, where the use is
116
pursuant to a physician’s recommendation.”
After making this
distinction, the court then analyzed the activity under the four117
factor Morrison test.
The Ninth Circuit found that the personal production,
possession, and use of medicinal marijuana were not economic
118
activity under Morrison’s first prong.
Citing Black’s Law
Dictionary, the court reasoned that “[l]acking sale, exchange or
distribution, the activity does not possess the essential elements of
119
commerce.”
The Justice Department argued even if true,
120
Wickard’s aggregation principle permitted federal involvement.
The court found Wickard inapplicable because, based on Lopez and
Morrison, aggregation only applies to activities that are economic in
121
character.
The majority continued to examine the other three
factors and concluded that the attenuated effects and jurisdictional
hook factors weighed in favor of the plaintiffs, and that the
122
legislative history favored the government.
111. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227-28.
112. Id. at 1228.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1230.
115. Id. at 1228, 1231.
116. Id. at 1230.
117. Id. at 1229-30.
118. Id. at 1229.
119. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (“commerce”)).
120. See id. at 1230.
121. Id. at 1230 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-11 n.4
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
122. Id. at 1231-35.
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In dissent, Judge Beam first argued that the plaintiffs lacked
123
standing to bring the suit. He argued that plaintiffs had made no
showing whatsoever that they had particular reason to fear that
federal prosecution or some other adverse action would be against
124
them.
Beam’s central disagreement over substance with the
majority concerned its decision to classify the activity at issue so
125
narrowly.
He compared the case to Wickard and argued the
majority’s classification was indefensible because the activity
involved in Wickard could have been described as “the intrastate,
126
noncommercial cultivation of wheat for personal food purposes.”
Although the majority and dissent did not disagree specifically
127
about the traditional state interest factor, the issue was intimately
related to definition of the class of activity each side chose to
128
adopt. The potential for Raich to influence other areas of health
care law also lies in this question. Raich will primarily influence
general Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but the Court’s
treatment of the traditional state interest factor in resolving the
constitutional question will also affect the relationship between
states and the federal government in regulating health care.
III. PUBLIC HEALTH AS A TRADITIONAL STATE CONCERN
A. Public Health and Its Boundaries
129

Chief Justice Marshall announced in Gibbons v. Ogden that a
state’s police power encompasses the ability to enact “health laws of
130
every description.” Eighty years after Gibbons, the Supreme Court
again declared that a state has always retained authority to make
131
The
regulations that “protect the public health and safety.”
132
Court has continuously repeated this pronouncement.
It has
123. Id. at 1236 (Beam, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1237.
125. See id. at 1238-39.
126. Id. at 1238.
127. See id. at 1238-39.
128. See id. The court did not address this relationship directly, but
California’s adoption of a medically oriented statute provided the basis for
narrowly classifying the activity. On the other hand, a broader classification of the
activity would downplay state regulation.
129. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
130. Id. at 203 (Chief Justice Marshall announcing the decision of the case).
131. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (regarding a
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even stated “a State’s power to regulate . . . for the purpose of
protecting the health of its citizens . . . is at the core of its police
133
power.”
Despite this powerful rhetoric, the Court has never
clarified what the public health police power entails. The
expansion of federal regulation in the field of health care since the
beginning of the 1900s makes it even more difficult to discern the
extent to which health care is a subject for state regulation. It is
necessary to closely inspect the origins of health care as a concern
for the state and recent federal involvement to understand the
issues the Supreme Court will face as it decides how to classify the
activity engaged in by the Raich plaintiffs.
B. Public Health and Health Care
The term “public health” is a broad classification of activities
dealing with personal and societal health. The World Health
Organization has defined achieving public health as “a state of
134
complete physical, mental, and social well being . . . .”
The
Institute of Medicine has an equally broad definition: “fulfilling
society’s interest in assuring conditions where people can be
135
healthy.”
Despite their breadth, both statements seem accurate
in identifying the broad swath cut by public health issues. These
statements are more esoteric than practical. If these definitions
guided public health practices, “the health department ought to be
136
the biggest state agency.”
We can find assistance in narrowing the topic by examining
what modern functions are generally within the purview of public
health agencies. These include the control and elimination of
city’s inherent police powers); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569
(1991) (upholding Indiana’s public nudity ban); City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479
U.S. 92, 95 (1986) (citing California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972))
(interpreting the Twenty-First Amendment); Head v. New Mex. Bd. of Exam’rs in
Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428 (1963) (stating, “the statute here involved is a
measure directly addressed to protection of the public health, and the statute thus
falls within the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the
police power.”).
133. Sporhase v. Neb., ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
134. WORLD HEALTH ORG., BASIC DOCS. 1 (41st ed. 1996).
135. COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 7 (1988) [hereinafter FUTURE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH].
136. Lawrence O Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s
Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 69
(1999) (defining public health).
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139

diseases and illness; sewage and garbage removal; quarantine;
140
licensing of
water filtration, fluoridification, and treatment;
141
142
medical professionals;
disclosure of medical information;
143
144
145
health education;
vaccinations;
pollution prevention;
146
inspections of private and commercial buildings; and regulation
147
of food and drugs.
Public health agencies may have the authority to reach only
148
Other matters that play important
one or all of these issues.
public health roles such as environmental regulation, policing and
crime control, poverty reduction, and labor protections are
typically resigned to other local, state, and federal agencies that
149
rarely or poorly coordinate with health officials.
Occasionally,
the lack of a coherent definition of public health has resulted in an
inability to deal effectively with large-scale problems that affect
150
social well-being.
Although public health encompasses a wide range of activities
and regulations, a great deal of it is outside the more particular
area of health care and closely related practices. By “health care,”
we refer to the region of public health that relates to the practice
and development of medicine. Under our definition, health care is
137. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 52 (2004).
138. See id. § 49.
139. See id. §§ 59-64.
140. See id. § 49; 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waterworks and Water Companies §§ 31-39.
141. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 80 (2004).
142. See id. § 83.
143. See id. § 49; 61A AM. JUR. 2D Pollution Control § 50 (2004).
144. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 247c (2004) (providing authorization for federal
funding of STD education and prevention programs); MINN. STAT. § 144.05, subd.
1(e) (2004) (providing that the state Department of Health “[p]romote personal
health by conducting general health education programs and disseminating
health information”).
145. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health §§ 65-69 (2004).
146. See id. §§ 70-79 (2004).
147. See id. § 49.
148. See FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 135, at 81-83.
149. See id. at Appendix A (describing organization of defined public health
agencies). What is not included in this assessment warrants attention. The
Department of Justice, Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of
Labor are conspicuously missing despite the reach over various medical and public
health activities. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1-1910.1018 (2004) (setting out
occupational health and safety standards for the Department of Labor). States
likewise divide resources and oversight between similar agencies. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. §§ 116.1-116.115 (2004) (establishing a pollution control agency separate
from state health agencies).
150. FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 135, at 81-83.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 7
7KREITMARCUS.DOC

976

3/13/2005 4:08:28 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

the process by which the medical profession is able to directly act to
benefit public well-being. These activities relate to the physical
involvement of doctors in directing and implementing personal
care and healthy living. This excludes such issues as crime control,
broad environmental concerns, and poverty reduction. With this
in mind, we identify six categories of traditional state health care
practices: (1) regulation of the practice of medicine through
151
licensing; (2) containment, treatment and elimination of disease
152
including sanitation, inoculation, and quarantine; (3) care for
153
154
155
the mentally ill; (4) health education; (5) vital statistics; (6)
156
and medical research. These categories may not be exclusive and
a thorough examination of each is not necessary to understanding
the traditional control of health care by the states, but they provide
a sufficient basis to categorize most current activities quickly. The
information to be gleaned from a historical summary is not what
specific activities states have historically carried out, but rather the
broad fundamental purposes behind these actions. Answering
these questions provides a basis for applying federalism principles
to current hot button issues.
C. A History of State Medical Regulation
1.

Colonial America

In the early years of the colonies, private or religious groups,
157
not community governments, often performed public services.
Health care, however, was very different. William Penn, while
looking for land for what was to become Philadelphia, wanted a

151. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 80 (2004).
152. See id. § 52.
153. See id. §§ 106-08.
154. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.055, subd. 1 (2004) (authorizing the
commissioner of health to develop and conduct health education programs).
155. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.213, subd. 1 (2004) (authorizing the
commissioner of health to maintain vital statistics).
156. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 247c (2004) (providing authorization for federal
funding of STD education and prevention programs); MINN. STAT. § 144.05, subd.
1(e) (2004) (providing that the state Department of Health “[p]romote personal
health by conducting general health education programs and disseminating
health information.”).
157. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the
Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 285-86 (1993)
(discussing public health practices in the colonial and federalist periods).
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location that was “navigable, high, dry, and healthy.”
He was
intimately concerned with the plague and fires that decimated
London and wanted a town consisting of widely spread lots so
159
contamination and fire could not easily ravage the city.
Penn
would have been disappointed to learn few public health
regulations were adopted in early Philadelphia, but the northern
160
cities quickly developed mechanisms to deal with sickness.
Like Penn, many early settlers came to North America
161
believing that the public health was a governmental function.
162
With
Disease was common and communities quickly responded.
little medical knowledge, settlers implemented policies that had
163
been used in Europe for hundreds of years.
Many of these
practices arose during Europe’s constant battle with the black
164
Those responsible for implementing health care polices
plague.
shared no common backgrounds.
Often, barber-surgeons,
religious leaders, or community officials implemented health care
165
measures.
In New Amsterdam, which would become New York, no
166
trained surgeons accompanied the first settlers.
When the first
surgeon with a medical degree arrived, the Governor was notified
167
and he soon became a member of the Council.
He was even
158. JOSEPH E. ILLICK, COLONIAL PENNSYLVANIA: A HISTORY 30 (1976) (quoting
William Penn).
159. Id. Penn was likely more concerned with potential fires than with disease.
His original plan called for the distribution of large plots of land so no house or
building would be close to another, thereby avoiding the spread of fire. Id.
160. See generally JOHN B. BLAKE, PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE TOWN OF BOSTON 16301822 3, 5-7 (1959) (stating how Boston settlers first relied upon other aspects of
society in addition to medical knowledge and beliefs in response to sickness, and
realizing they needed to train their own physicians); JOHN DUFFY, A HISTORY OF
PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK CITY 1625-1866 7-10 (1968) (stating New York
implemented an ordinance directed at immoderate drinking, and another action
intended to keep the area clean).
161. See Parmet, supra note 157, at 286.
162. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 3-7 (stating settlers “frequently held fast days .
. . because of sickness,” and the President of Harvard requested funding for
medical books to help provide an educational basis for medical training).
163. See generally id. at 8 (noting that many early medical practitioners learned
via an “apprenticeship system” modeled after the teaching method used in
England).
164. See generally Katherine Park, Medicine and the Renaissance, in WESTERN
MEDICINE: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 66-79 (Irvine Loudon, ed., 1997); BERNHARD J.
STERN, SOCIETY AND MEDICAL PROGRESS 21-24 (1941).
165. DUFFY, supra note 160, at 8-9.
166. Id. at 7.
167. Id. at 9 (Dr. Johannes La Montagne, New York’s first physician, arrived in
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responsible for making exceptions to a City Council edict granting
barber-surgeons the exclusive rights to practice their trade, making
168
it possibly the first medical licensing rule in the colonies. Boston
attempted to institute “licensing” in 1649, but had no method of
169
enforcement.
Licensing was, at least in part, an attempt to assure the public
170
of quality care when very few people were well trained.
As the
early New York experience shows, the partnership between medical
practitioners and public officials was an early and essential
171
development in state health administration.
Officials would rely
on the advice of privately trained doctors and back their educated
172
opinions with the force of law.
Licensing constituted only one of several key health care
policies developed in early America. Most colonists understood the
need to be proactive in preventing illness. By the turn of the
eighteenth century, much of the hold religious institutions had
173
This allowed
over Boston’s government affairs had diminished.
174
health conscious citizens to advocate their causes to city leaders.
175
The shift significantly altered the role of the medical community.
Instead of religious doctrines guiding the course of health care
practices, the direct connection with city leaders permitted a more
176
secular and scientific approach.
Responding to this advice, Boston’s selectmen and General
Court imposed sanitary restrictions on butchers, distillers, and
others to prevent decay and nuisances from invading the city
177
streets.
It also experimented with street cleaning and waste
178
regulations, mostly to keep city streets free of filth.
Boston also
successfully adopted a standard port quarantine process requiring
1637).
168. Id.
169. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 9 (stating that “the General Court in 1649
required surgeons, physicians, and midwives to do nothing contrary to the known
approved rules of their art . . . but provided no means of execution”).
170. See id.; see also DUFFY, supra note 160, at 9, 33-34.
171. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 9.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 23-26; see JAMES F. COOPER, JR., TENACIOUS OF THEIR LIBERTIES: THE
CONGREGATIONALISTS IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS 11-14 (1999) (discussing the
early role churches played in controlling Massachusetts politics).
174. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 23-24.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 29.
178. Id. at 30-31.
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interrogations of all incoming ships; if any crew member was sick or
if its departure point was experiencing an epidemic, no crew would
179
be let ashore.
In the late seventeenth century New Amsterdam fell under
180
The city’s Council passed a
English rule and became New York.
law in 1693 that permitted a tax on residents for cleansing and
181
paving the streets, although it was not truly effective.
The city
also passed laws to prevent the roaming of hogs and cattle which
“‘cause[d] great stench and filth within this City,’ help[ed] to
182
infect the streets, and thus engender[ed] serious sickness.”
These first sanitation laws reflected a commitment on the part of
183
local officials proactively to involve themselves in public health.
The state of medicine was such that one of the few agreed upon
184
principles was that filth and putrescence brought disease. If filth
was a disease-causing agent, it was the city’s responsibility to fix the
185
problem.
New York also followed Massachusetts’ lead and established a
186
basic licensure law.
It ordered that no person shall practice
medicine without the consent of an established member of the
profession “to restrain the presumptuous arrogance of such as,
through confidence of their own skill or any other sinister respects,
dare boldly attempt to exercise violence upon or towards the body .
187
The law was severely underenforced, but it established a
. . .”
framework for direct public involvement in the practice of private
188
medicine.
Probably the most notable actor in the licensure movement
was Dr. Caldwaller Colden of New York. He practiced as a surgeon
189
and quickly rose to become a leading public official.
He was

179. Id. at 32.
180. See HENRY WILLIAM ELSON, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 138
(1904), available at http://www.usahistory.info/colonies/New-York.html.
181. DUFFY, supra note 160, at 25-26.
182. Id. at 29.
183. Id. at 23-24.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 33.
187. Id. (quoting JAMES J. WALSH, HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 11 (1907)).
188. Id. at 33-34.
189. Id. at 42-43. “[H]e was without question the first significant medical
figure in New York.” Id. at 43.
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influential in establishing the first statewide licensing law in 1760.
It required that all persons wishing to practice medicine must
appear before an appointed government council and imposed fines
191
on any person caught practicing without a license.
The laws
increased the value of medical education to both the community
and to doctors who were financially dependant upon those willing
192
to see them.
The more visible regulation of medical professionals also
encouraged the creation of hospitals, or sick houses. By 1773, New
York had appropriated money and land to several esteemed
members of a recently founded medical college and construction
193
began. The rise of the medical college, the hospital and licensing
194
As licensing increased a doctor’s need for
were all interrelated.
education, the greater student enrolments required clinics where
195
the trade could be practiced.
Boston developed much faster in
this area as the city’s Selectmen approved a quarantine hospital in
196
Public officials made ad-hoc decisions regarding whom to
1719.
quarantine, but relied on the opinion of respected doctors before
197
making a final order.
Mass epidemics were likely the impetus for most public action
as exhibited by cities’ significant investment in quarantine laws.
Smallpox brought disaster to Boston in 1721, 1729, and again in
198
1752 killing hundreds and sickening thousands. Philadelphia was
199
plagued in 1736 and Charleston was hit in 1738.
The epidemics
marked two important changes in public health care. First,
inoculations were invented and local governments became
200
contentiously involved in their regulation.
Many of the new
190. Id. at 65.
191. Id. at 65-66. Medical licensing was still very much in its infancy and not
very effective. Medical societies that were largely constituted with educated
doctors wanted to ensure the sanctity of their professions, but had little ability to
oversee daily operation of apprenticed or self trained surgeons. For a more
thorough discussion of early licensing see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 44-47 (1982).
192. DUFFY, supra note 160, at 65.
193. Id. at 66-67.
194. Id. at 65-66.
195. Id. at 66.
196. BLAKE, supra note 160, at 35-36.
197. Id. at 46.
198. Id. at 54-55, 75, 83-87 (noting the various outbreaks).
199. Id. at 78, 82. Philadelphia took little effort in developing any long term
strategies and was hit with minor epidemics nearly every four years. Id. at 111-12.
200. Id. at 62-63, 96-97.
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educated doctors inoculated the sick without city approval,
sparking concern among public officials that the practice may
201
endanger rather than benefit public health.
Eventually city
governments caved, and although many had made vaccination
illegal for a period, most eventually permitted or required
202
vaccinations.
The debate marks an important chapter in state
experimentation. Communities did not practice inoculation in the
same manner. Boston experienced a fifty-year battle over whether
inoculation was a desired or healthy activity and at points outlawed
203
the practice.
New York on the other hand embraced it mid204
century and continued to inoculate despite controversy.
The increase of quarantine houses was also dramatic, but most
importantly, epidemics encouraged the recording of vital
205
statistics.
Cities began experimenting with inoculation and
needed to assess effectiveness.
Although birth and death
certificates had been issued in Boston for nearly 100 years, the
records were incomplete and not much significance to public
206
health.
Taking toll of the causes of death was probably essential
for students of medicine who could now look at patterns of disease
and attempt to discern root causes.
The inability of doctors to determine the etiology of most
diseases also pressed governing bodies to pursue preventive
207
In early and
sanitation and curative quarantine strategies.
revolutionary America, much of medical science was devoted to
understanding and curing disease, and this was closely related to
208
sanitation. Practitioners did not understand germ theory and saw
their job as not only treating the sick, but also providing conditions
209
to keep them healthy. For example, cities would often halt ships
210
Even more astonishing, often
at port if infection was present.
every ship departing from plagued cities was ordered inspected,
often by medical professionals, until the epidemic was considered

201. Id.
202. Id. at 114-15.
203. Id. at 52-73 (discussing the beginning of the inoculation debate), 82-98
(discussing the later years of the inoculation debate).
204. Id. at 97.
205. Id. at 106-07.
206. Id. at 106.
207. See Parmet, supra note 157, at 295.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 80-82.
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211

over.
These positions would become even more pronounced in
212
post revolutionary states.
2.

Post-Revolution and Municipal Controls

By 1800 it was clear that local and state government had a role
to play in health care. Johann Peter Frank, an enlightenment
writer and doctor, believed the core function of government was to
act as “medical police” to “apply certain principles for the health
213
care of people living in society.” The city of Chicago was founded
on these principles in 1833 after a cholera epidemic necessitated
214
an organized response.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court issued one the most
resounding and clear indications of health care’s role in city
215
governance. In Baker v. City of Boston, a landowner had used a
creek running by his property to transport goods, which the city
216
had set to fill.
He challenged the right of the city to restrict his
access to water, but the court found it was within the right and duty
217
of the city to do what it must to protect public health.
It has not been denied, nor can it be, that the mayor and
aldermen are clothed with legislative powers and
prerogatives to a certain extent, and that they are fully
empowered to adopt measures of police, for the purpose
of preserving the health, and promoting the comfort,
convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants within
the city. Among these powers no one is more important
than that for the preservation of the public health. It is
not only the right but the imperative duty of the city
government, to watch over the health of the citizens, and
to remove every nuisance, so far as they may be able,
which may endanger it. And they have necessarily the

211.
212.
213.

Id. at 78.
Parmet, supra note 157, at 295-96.
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 192 (1996) (quoting JOHANN PETER FRANK, A System
of Complete Medical Police, in SELECTIONS FROM JOHANN PETER FRANK (Erna Lesky ed.,
1976)).
214. Id. at 193. By the following year, “a stringent health code (including
provisions for the removal of nuisances, the disposal of waste, street cleaning,
house inspection, mandatory public works, a cholera hospital, and Committees of
Vigilance) greeted the onset of a new cholera season.” Id.
215. 12 Pick. 184 (Mass. 1831).
216. Id. at 188.
217. Id. at 198.
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power of deciding in what manner this shall be done; and
their decision is conclusive, unless they transcend the
powers conferred by the city charter, or violate the
218
constitution.
The strength of this language is not surprising considering
every member on the court lived through the small pox and “yellow
fever” epidemics (mostly typhoid, typhus, and malaria) that swept
219
the east coast in the early nineteenth century. The diseases were
disastrous and hit every city on a near yearly basis causing
220
Even before 1800, New York
evacuations and mass quarantines.
authorized a commission to study the conditions and causes of
221
disease.
The resulting report covered everything from possible
causes to recommended solutions and set the stage for a flurry of
222
activities. By 1810, New York had a full time city health inspector,
a Board of Health, and had taken the recommendation of local
223
The New
doctors to require the issuance of death certificates.
York Board even commissioned medical studies to pave the
224
direction for new policies.
Philadelphia had established its Board of Health before the
turn of the century and although Boston’s Board was founded in
225
1799, it did not get full state authorization until 1816.
In both
cases, however, the Boards were given broad and welcomed powers.
Boston’s Board was permitted “to make rules, regulations and
orders for preventing, removing, or destroying nuisances, sources
226
of filth, and causes of sickness . . . .” These included regulations
on everything from specifying burial site depth to recording the
218. Id. at 197-98.
219. See generally BLAKE, supra note 160, at 126-27, 151-76; DUFFY, supra note
160, at 97-123.
220. BLAKE, supra note 160, at 126-27, 151-76; DUFFY, supra note 160, at 97-123.
The problem is that the illnesses being contracted probably were not significantly
affected by most public health measures. Quarantine would have been only
moderately effective, and possibly detrimental, because most of the illnesses were
bacterial mosquito borne, not contagious like the plague. While draining cellars
and filling bogs helped, it probably did not resolve the problem.
221. DUFFY, supra note 160, at 135-37.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 143-49.
224. Id. at 156.
225. NOVAK, supra note 213, at 201. It is also important to note that Boston was
not actually chartered as a city until 1822. Prior to that, most governing had been
at the county level, not by city governance. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 234.
226. NOVAK, supra note 213, at 201 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 44 (1816),
“An act to empower the town of Boston to choose a Board of Health, and to
prescribe their power and duty.”).
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227

name, age, and sex of the deceased.
New York’s board was comprised of predominantly medical
228
officials.
Boston’s early health officials were mostly politicians,
often seeking appointment to the board as a political stepping229
Despite these differences, heads of the boards took their
stone.
roles seriously. Benjamin Whitman, who served as Chair of the
Boston Board of Health for twelve years, upon his resignation
stated:
It is . . . all important that the Board of Health, who are
daily conversant with the state and condition of the city . .
. and with those causes which aggravate disorders, and
impair the health and comfort of the people, should have
the power . . . promptly and effectually to make all such
230
orders and regulations, as become indispensable . . . .
Like other pronouncements of the era, the Board’s power was
not meant to address issues such as poverty or economic concerns.
In 1819, Boston’s Board expressed the limits of its authority after a
physician called its attention to the poverty that often resulted from
long bouts with disease:
[I]t is not within [our] official powers or duty, to afford
relief to that unhappy family—as [our] authority and duty
only extends to such sick and diseased persons, as are
affected, or eminently exposed to contagious or
malignant disorders, such as jeopardize the health and life
of the citizens . . . and not to cases of poverty and distress
231
or sickness of an ordinary nature . . . .
These self imposed limitations did not prevent the boards
from achieving moderate successes. Cities dramatically improved
programs for sanitation, quarantine housing, and some basic
232
However, the lack of
treatment in substandard hospitals.
significant medical advancements during the period meant little
changed in the methods used to combat health care problems.
The medical revolution of the mid-nineteenth century would
inevitably expand the state’s role in medical regulation even
227. BLAKE, supra note 160, at 212, 214.
228. See DUFFY, supra note 160, at 130-44.
229. BLAKE, supra note 160, at 230.
230. Id. at 236 (quoting Bd. of Health, Comm. of Week, Records (1821-24),
May 10, 1823 (farewell address by Benjamin Whitman)).
231. Id. at 241 (quoting Bd. of Health, Comm. of Week, Records (1821-21),
Aug. 17, 1819 (the Board members’ response)).
232. See id. at 192, 207.
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further.
3.

The Modern State Administrative System

The medical advancements of the mid-nineteenth century
such as anesthesia, sterilization of instruments, and the eventual
understanding of germ theory transformed the medical profession
233
Medical college admissions and graduate
and its regulations.
234
rates soared accordingly. This placed an economic hurdle before
well-trained and well-educated clinicians who were competing with
235
many self-taught or simply self-professed doctors.
Educated doctors, who were probably motivated in part by
their wallets and in part by legitimate concern for the practice of
their profession, succeeded in finally pressuring state health boards
236
to enact clear and strong licensing laws by the 1870s.
These
licensing schemes, like their predecessors, never explicitly
delineated control over specific practices. Rather, licensure laws
simply required accreditation from reputable medical programs
237
and left the practice of medicine to the medical community.
It
was clear administrators would not and could not effectively control
medical developments. As was the case in the Colonies, doctors
would go to public officials, present their ideas, and regulations
would be born.
The number of people graduating from medical schools had
another important impact: hospital growth. What began as a
proliferation of quarantine hospitals nearly a century earlier was by
1850 a new public necessity. For example, between 1800 and 1855,
238
Bellevue’s patient role increased nearly 1000 percent. By 1860 it
was treating nearly 6000 patients annually, and thousands more
were being seen at one of New York’s eight other newly developed
239
hospitals and asylums.
Additionally, grim facilities were opened

233. See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and Regulation of Medical Practice: A
Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in
ERISA—Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 209-10
(1999).
234. See DUFFY, supra note 160, at 473.
235. See id. at 474-75; STARR, supra note 191, at 81-85.
236. See STARR, supra note 191, at 81-85; Richards, supra note 233, at 211.
237. Richards, supra note 233, at 211.
238. DUFFY, supra note 160, at 250 (only 186 patients were seen over the peak
summer months in 1803).
239. Id. at 498-99.
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240

to “treat” the mentally ill.
Prior to 1825, most communities did not consider insanity a
241
health care issue.
Insanity was instead often viewed as a moral
disease. Communities would send ill individuals to prisons, care for
them privately, or in some cases literally sneak the impaired into
242
neighboring towns with the hope of pushing off their burden.
While several asylums existed, care for the mentally ill was not
considered a public function until Massachusetts took the lead in
243
1838.
Many local communities would pay for the housing of the
dangerously ill, but as the number of terminally mentally ill
patients increased, cities could no longer afford to deal with them
244
effectively.
This resulted in battles between state and local
245
authorities.
Local governments did not want to give up power over their
institutional housing, but needed the financial backing of the
246
state.
Expectedly, local governments were soon largely cut out.
Since state funding was at issue, the state needed to regulate
247
admissions, length of stays, and treatments provided.
It is not
necessary to delve into the type of care provided or the extent to
which health professionals were involved in the legislation. The
nature of the service can be gleaned from the debate between state
248
and local officials.
Both governing bodies envisioned care for ill
249
When the state
citizens as part of their primary responsibility.
eventually assumed the position, it was seen as a partnership
between the local and state level; federal involvement was not even
considered.
Significant state involvement naturally led to the creation of
permanent oversight agencies. Lemuel Shattuck’s 1850 Report of the
Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts was influential in reorganizing
state public health planning and succeeded in instituting the first

240.
241.

Id. at 499-500.
See RUTH B. CAPLAN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE COMMUNITY IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA: THE RECURRING CONCERN WITH THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS 65-66 (1969).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 66.
244. Id. at 66-67.
245. Id. at 67.
246. Id. at 67-70.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 63.
249. Id. at 66.
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250

state Board of Health in 1869. As one author describes:
State boards were usually charged with the following
responsibilities: (1) the organization of local boards; (2)
the collection of medical and vital statistics; (3) the
investigation of the causes of disease and mortality; (4)
the removal of causes of disease (especially nuisances)
with the cooperation of local sanitary officers; (5) the
supervision of state hygiene institutions like prisons and
251
asylums; and (6) the supervision of quarantine.
The idea of statewide agencies and uniform public health
governance attracted many around the country. In 1872, the
American Public Health Association was founded and quickly
252
The
issued recommendations on state health care practices.
Association urged state boards to conduct oversight, assistance, and
collection of statistics, but sanitation and individual care should
253
remain at the local level. Shortly after, public health laboratories
254
were founded to research the causes of, and cures for, diseases.
Both state and local laboratories were to detect diseases and design
controls, develop new diagnostic procedures, and manufacture and
255
distribute vaccines. By 1913 every state had some form of health
256
department.
The short history detailed above does not provide an
exhaustive examination of the multitude of activities in which states
have traditionally engaged, but it does indicate the ways in which
health care was a chief regulatory area of state and local
governments. Although the size and reach of public health bodies
drastically expanded over the last 100 years, the basic functions
performed by local communities and state offices have not
significantly changed.
D. Federal Regulation: A Modern Tradition
The real emergence of national action in the health care arena
257
arose with Roosevelt’s New Deal.
Prior to 1900, the federal
250. WILSON G. SMILLIE, PUBLIC HEALTH ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
13 (1935).
251. NOVAK, supra note 213, at 203.
252. See SMILLIE, supra note 250, at 213, 216-17.
253. Id. at 17-18.
254. Id. at 18.
255. Id. at 175-80.
256. Id. at 16, fig. II.
257. See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12
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government only marginally involved itself in health care
258
Within the first quarter of the century, however,
activities.
Congress made a few significant regulations that paved the way for
the explosion in federal health care involvement. In 1906,
Congress passed the Food and Drug Act, which sought to prevent
adulteration, mislabeling, and fraud in the food and drug
259
industry.
Its requirements aimed at “protecting the pocketbook
260
Today, the revised Act
of the consumer as much as the health.”
regulates nearly all the “testing, marketing, and promotion” of
261
medicines in the United States.
However, both the original and
revised Act of 1938 applied, on its face, to only those items
262
introduced to or received in interstate commerce. The Maternity
and Infancy Act of 1921, another important pre-New Deal step, was
the first major federal spending program devoted to public
263
health.
Funding was given to states that agreed to develop
264
obstetrics and child care programs.
These laws signify the two main sources of federal health care
265
authority—the spending power under Article 1, Section 8 and the
266
The manner of
commerce power under Article 1, Section 8.
regulation associated with each is significantly different. The
spending power does not enable Congress to require or to forcefully
267
prevent direct action by a state. Rather, if Congress would like a
state to adopt a particular program, it must offer the state a
268
choice. The state can receive federal dollars only if it adopts the
269
However, the state has the
measures suggested by Congress.

J.L. & HEALTH 309, 331 (1998).
258. Id. at 331-33; JENNIE JACOBS KRONEFELD, THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN
U.S. HEALTH CARE POLICY 67-69 (1997).
259. KRONEFELD, supra note 258, at 70.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2002) (providing a clear jurisdictional hook).
263. Id.; Hodge, supra note 257, at 332.
264. Hodge, supra note 257, at 332.
265. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
266. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
267. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 438 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (implying that
the federal government cannot compel state action pursuant to the spending
power).
268. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
(stating that a state must be given the free choice to voluntarily accept or reject
federal funds).
269. Id.
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authority to reject the funding and not implement the program.
The passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, which established the
federal income tax, provided the government with an enormous
271
new purse with which the government could finance, among
other things, health care initiatives. The Social Security Act of 1935
was the first major national push to make use of these new funds.
It established direct aid for maternal and child services and
invested in local boards of health, health laboratories, and research
272
into disease and sanitation control.
The Supreme Court has not
addressed the constitutionality of the spending portion of the
273
Presumably, this is because the power to spend for the
Act.
general welfare was presumed by most to be a valid exercise of
federal authority.
Under the spending power, Congress possesses nearly
unlimited discretion as to how and on what programs tax dollars
274
will be spent.
It is constrained only by the rule that while
Congress may encourage states to act, it cannot compel a state to
275
carry out those acts. This has allowed for a large federal effort to
help improve health care in the United States, pursuant to the
government’s ability to spend for the general welfare. For instance,
the National Institute of Health, which was founded in 1930 for the
basic purpose of researching hygiene and disease, has blossomed to
include a National Cancer Institute, National Eye Institute,
National Institute on Child Health and Human Development, and
even a National Center for Complimentary and Alternative
276
Medicine, to name just a few.
These centers and institutes are
primarily research, development, and financial assistance bodies,
developing programs and strategies which are then offered to states
277
for implementation.
Other Acts, like the Mental Health Act of
270. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202-03 (making
distinctions between impermissible coercion and a situation where states are “free
to reject” the funding).
271. Hodge, supra note 257, at 333.
272. KRONEFELD, supra note 258, at 70-71.
273. See generally Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1938) (upholding
the statutes’ taxing authority).
274. See South Dakota v. Dole, 438 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987) (establishing the
few limitations on the spending power).
275. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
276. See National Institute of Health, Institutes Centers, and Offices, at
http://www.nih.gov/icd/ (listing twenty institutes currently within the National
Institute of Health).
277. Id. (providing brief descriptions of each institute).
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1946, the Mental Retardation Facilities & Community Mental
Health Service Act of 1963 which financed the growth and
development of local mental health facilities, and the passage of
278
Medicare and Medicaid in 1966 further expanded federal reach.
In contrast to the spending power, the commerce power
enables Congress to prevent certain state (or even private) activities
that differ from the manner in which it desires to regulate
279
280
commerce. For example, the Controlled Substance Act (CSA),
enacted in 1970, sets a baseline for all marketing, distribution, and
sale of drugs in the United States. The CSA goes beyond many
other federal health care measures by attempting to regulate very
local activities within the medical profession. The CSA includes
provisions governing the quantity of drugs that may be prescribed
281
or distributed. The Attorney General is authorized to revoke the
registration of any person who does not comply with these
282
provisions and the CSA even allows suspension if the Attorney
General deems an action to be “an imminent danger to the public
283
health or safety.”
Although the CSA is not an express statement of control over
health care decisions, the modern practice of medicine necessitates
the use of some type of drug. The apparent discretion given to the
Attorney General to decide whether an action is an imminent
threat to public health gives the office enormous control over
284
medical decisions.
The CSA, by its own terms, also directly
285
It
governs the mere possession of a controlled substance.
curiously fails to require that the substance be manufactured,
distributed, or even that the possessor have the intent to distribute
or manufacture the substance. Governing the mere possession of
drugs pushed federal regulation into uncharted territory.
Federal reach under the Commerce Clause has also affected
278. See FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 135, at 68.
279. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (discussing recognition of regulatory
power over private activities specifically and regulatory powers more generally).
280. Controlled Substance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2004)).
281. 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(1)(c) (2004).
282. Id. § 824(a)(4).
283. Id. § 824(d).
284. Id. § 824(d). The Attorney General will be able to make medical
decisions regarding when a drug is an imminent danger, which could restrict
doctors in their ability to prescribe medications they believe will assist their
patients.
285. Id. § 844(a).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/7

34

Kreit and Marcus: Raich, Health Care, and the Commerce Clause
7KREITMARCUS.DOC

2005]

3/13/2005 4:08:28 PM

RAICH, HEALTH CARE, COMMERCE CLAUSE

991

medical decision-making in less direct ways. In 1974, Congress
passed the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act
286
(ERISA).
A main provision of the Act preempts state laws that
287
These plans include employer
relate to employee benefit plans.
288
provided health care plans. States that desire to ensure insurance
companies provide the type and quality of care believed most
beneficial to its citizens have often found ERISA imposed
289
preemption bars.
This includes such things as state tort and
contract actions when state law requires coverage for certain
290
medical practices, but the employer’s selected plan does not.
A detailed history and overview of federal public health
regulation is beyond the scope of this article, but the examples
given above provide an adequate look into the nature of federal
health care regulation. Today, federal health care programs are
mostly governed by six agencies: “1) The Centers for Disease
Control; (2) the National Institutes of Health; (3) the Food and
Drug Administration; (4) The Health Resources and Services
Administration; (5) the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health
Administration; and (6) the Agency for Toxic Substances and
291
Disease Registry.”
These combined agencies are involved in
many aspects of health care. They assess and gather health related
statistics, research and develop cures for diseases, implement
funding for health care and medical provisions, develop and
implement health care policies, seek to educate the public and
health care professionals, and a host of other activities from policy
292
setting to direct care.

286. See Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
287. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2004) (including benefit plans as defined in 29
U.S.C. § 1003 (2004)).
288. 29 U.S.C. § 1103.
289. See James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health
Care: A Call for “Cooperative Federalism” to Preserve the States’ Role in Formulating Health
Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 405, 439-42 (1994).
290. Id. at 420-21.
291. FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 135, at 166.
292. Id. at 168-70.
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IV. RAICH AND THE REACH OF NEW FEDERALISM
A. The Role of Traditional State Interests
Because Lopez and Morrison do not address where the
traditional state interest issue falls into the Commerce Clause
analysis, it is possible that the Court will follow the Ninth Circuit
293
and resolve Raich without discussing the extent to which health
care is traditionally a state concern. If the Court does exclude the
issue from its analysis in Raich entirely, it could affect future health
care-related Commerce Clause cases by signaling that the
traditional state interest consideration will not factor into Morrison
analysis. A result along those lines, however, would speak more to
the future of Commerce Clause jurisprudence generally than to
health care. Likewise, the Court may dispose of Raich, without
reaching the Commerce Clause issue at all, by holding that the
294
plaintiffs do not have standing.
Because the first scenario would
impact health care at most tangentially, and the second not at all,
the implications of both are beyond the scope of this article. The
more likely scenario is that the Court will follow Lopez and Morrison
and include the traditional state concern issue in its Commerce
Clause analysis. The potential for Raich to have a broader impact
on health care rests in this possibility—in how the Supreme Court
will define, interpret, and weigh the traditional state interest at
295
issue.
Part III reveals that, while health care has traditionally been
the province of the states, the federal government has become
increasingly involved in regulating health. In addition, it is clear
that a great deal of federal health care regulation is constitutional
and, without discussing the merits of particular policies, we
293. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
294. Although neither party has addressed standing in its briefs to the
Supreme Court, Judge Beam’s Ninth Circuit dissent argued that the plaintiffs did
not have standing. Id. at 1235-37 (Beam J., dissenting).
295. See supra Part II.B. Although the parties briefed the question of medical
necessity to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit did not address this question
and the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on the issue. See Raich, 352 F.3d
1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 2909 (June 28, 2004) (No. 03-1454).
So, though a holding on medical necessity grounds would also have an effect on
health care generally, these facts make it unlikely that the Court will address
medical necessity for individual use in Raich.
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generally believe that significant federal involvement in health care
is desirable. In the area of Medicaid, for example, ceding federal
power to states may weaken patient protections and decrease the
296
access to health care for poor, disabled, or elderly citizens.
Federal power over some areas of public health may even preclude
297
298
state regulation, either through preemption or the dormant
Commerce Clause, which prevents states from engaging in divisive
299
Few of the major federal
or protectionist regulatory policies.
health regulations, such as Medicaid, conflict with the notion that
health care is traditionally a state concern. But, the federal
government’s increased involvement in health policy contributes to
the difficulty for the Supreme Court in Raich of addressing and
defining which areas of health care constitute a traditional state
concern and which do not.
The plaintiffs and the Government in Raich both argue that
the traditional state concern factor weighs in their favor. The
Government argues that the plaintiffs wish to “function essentially
as unregulated and unsupervised drug manufacturers and
300
pharmacies”
and that the determination of what medical
products can be made available for medical use is not an area of
301
regulation traditionally reserved to the states.
The plaintiffs’
argue that the federal government has primary authority over
protecting consumers from misbranded drugs but that the
relationship between patients and doctors is an area traditionally

296. See generally Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” Approach to
Medicaid: Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States Harms
Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973 (2001) (arguing that empirical evidence indicates
increasing state control over Medicaid leads to undesirable results).
297. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to
State Health Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 121 (1993) (discussing the various ways
in which federal authority may preclude states from experimenting with health
care reforms).
298. See supra Part III (discussing how ERISA preempts state regulation in
employee benefits).
299. Maine’s effort to lower prescription drug prices for people without a
prescription drug insurance plan is an example of a state healthcare policy that
faced a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. The Supreme Court, however,
ruled in favor of Maine. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003);
see also Whitney Magee Phelps, Comment, Maine’s Prescription Drug Plan: A Look Into
the Controversy, 65 ALB. L. REV. 243 (2001) (discussing the dormant Commerce
Clause issues related to Maine’s prescription drug law).
300. Petitioners’ Brief at 33-34, Raich (No. 03-1454).
301. Brief of Amici Curiae Dupont at 15-17, Raich (No. 03-1454) [hereinafter
Dupont Brief].
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302

reserved to the states. This question is, in some ways, tied to the
Commerce Clause question of what level of generality should be
303
used to define the regulated class of activities.
However, the
Supreme Court’s analysis of the traditional state concern issue
would impact health care’s relationship with the Commerce Clause
independent of the purely Commerce Clause questions.
If the Court accepts the Government’s argument that the
activity at issue is not a traditional state concern, it is difficult to
imagine a health care related activity that would be. This is because
the Government argues that the federal power to regulate
interstate medical products also extends over the state’s traditional
role in regulating the doctor patient relationship despite the purely
304
intrastate character of the activity.
“In short, neither the
purported medical use of marijuana nor the role of a physician in
approving it provides the slightest basis for excluding it from the
305
comprehensive coverage of the CSA . . . .” If the Court finds this
reasoning persuasive in the context of its traditional state interest
analysis, it would hold that the unchallenged federal power over
306
commercial interstate distribution of medicines
includes the
corollary intrastate regulation of related activities. This theory
would not necessarily preclude all Commerce Clause challenges
related to health care. A government regulation might still fail the
Morrison test even if the activity regulated is not a traditional state
interest. But such a reading would make it difficult to conceive of a
health care activity that could be classified as a traditional state
concern.
Similarly, the Court could find that the activity in Raich is
traditionally left to the states and still hold for the Government
based on the four Morrison factors. This outcome, though, is
probable only if the Court accepts the Government’s assertion that
the activity at issue is the regulation of medical products. But,
302. See generally Nurses Brief at 17, Raich (No. 03-15481).
303. Compare Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars, Raich (No. 031454) with Petitioners’ Brief, Raich (No. 03-1454). For example, the government’s
traditional state concern argument dovetails with its assertion that the activity
engaged in by the plaintiffs should be defined broadly as “affect[ing] the
marijuana market as a whole” for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis.
Petitioners’ Brief at 20.
304. Petitioners’ Brief at 40-41.
305. Id. at 41.
306. See Nurses Brief at 5-6 (agreeing that Congress has used its commerce
power to protect consumers from interstate sales of medicines but arguing that
this power has not historically included intrastate activity).
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whatever the ultimate outcome of Raich, the plaintiff’s position on
the state interest issue seems to align closely and persuasively with
the history of health care regulation in the United States. The
plaintiffs distinguish local health care activity, like the physician’s
practice of medicine, as an area traditionally regulated and left to
the states from the sort of health care the federal government has
307
historically regulated. This accurately reflects the vast majority of
federal health care laws, which have not generally intruded into
state functions but rather attacked problems that states had not—
and possibly could not have—dealt with themselves. For example,
the 1906 Food and Drug Act, “Congress’ first significant enactment
308
in the field of public health,” did not regulate an area already
addressed by the states. Indeed, one of the Government’s amici
acknowledges that “[i]n 1900, medical products were essentially
309
unregulated,” even as it argues that the 1906 Act demonstrates
the federal government has traditionally regulated the activity at
310
But the 1906 Act had nothing to do with
issue in Raich.
regulating the relationship between physicians and patients that
had traditionally been left to the states; rather, it was enacted to
combat the widespread problem of interstate trade in adulterated
311
and misbranded drugs.
Like a great deal of federal health care legislation, the 1906
Act did not encroach into areas regulated by the states. It
regulated health care in a way states had not.
The expansion of national powers into the field of public
health prompted a change in public health objectives . . . .
Merely controlling the effects of public health problems
was inadequate. National powers allowed for the broad
regulation of the very conditions which led to such
problems. Thus, public health strategy has changed from
the localized treatment and prevention of public health
dilemmas to the advance control of the conditions in
312
which such effects arose.
Supreme Court cases from the early 1900s confirm the
distinction between the scope of federal regulation and the areas of
health care traditionally left to the states. In Linder v. United
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Raich (No. 03-15481).
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
Brief of Amici Curiae Dupont at 15, Raich (No. 03-1454).
Id. at 16.
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475.
Hodge, supra note 257, at 337-38.
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313

States, the Court addressed the application of the Harrison Act—a
1914 law regulating products containing opium and cocaine
through Congress’ taxing power—to a tax-paying physician who
had given one tablet of morphine and three tablets of cocaine to
314
an addicted patient, without filing out the appropriate tax form.
The statute imposed a tax on a physician’s distribution of opiates
and coca-derived substances in the course of his professional
315
services, but the Government argued that distribution to an
addict, without supervision and control of a physician, was outside
316
the professional practice of medicine. The Court disagreed with
this argument, stating that “direct control of medical practice in
317
the States is beyond the power of the Federal Government.”
Linder, which was decided well after the government began to
regulate interstate traffic in medicine, supports the distinction
318
advanced by the plaintiffs.
If the Court holds that the activity in
Raich has traditionally been a state concern, it will clarify some of
the possible tensions between the notion of health care as a state
concern and the increase in federal public health regulation
consistent with the traditional understanding articulated in Linder.
The holding could have a strong impact on other areas of health
care by influencing healthcare-related Commerce Clause cases.
But the ruling would not jeopardize the vast majority of federal
health care law that is either unrelated to Congress’ commerce
power or unquestionably regulates commercial activity. Such a
holding would not automatically place local health care activity
outside the scope of federal regulatory power, as overlapping
319
regulatory authority between state and federal law is possible.
The potential impact of adopting this distinction in Raich on future
Commerce Clause cases is best demonstrated by analyzing how it
313. 268 U.S. 5 (1925). This case is also discussed by amici to the plaintiffs in
Raich. Nurses Brief at 17, Raich (No. 03-15481).
314. Linder, 268 U.S. at 11.
315. Id. at 12.
316. Id. at 16. “[The tablets] were not administered by him or by any nurse or
other person acting under his direction, nor were they consumed or intended for
consumption in his presence.” Id.
317. Id. at 18.
318. Id. at 17. “Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated
power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the Federal
Government.“ Id.
319. As noted above, the Court in Raich could find that the plaintiff’s activity
has traditionally been regulated by the states, but hold against them because of
other Commerce Clause factors.
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might affect examples of particular federal health care regulations
grounded in the commerce power.
B. Health Care Law After Raich
1.

Medical Marijuana

California’s Compassionate Use Act (CUA) is a model of
current state/federal health care conflicts. The CUA was designed
not as a market regulatory tool, but solely as a public health
320
measure.
Its purpose was “[t]o ensure that seriously ill
Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical
purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has
been recommended by a physician who has determined that the
321
person’s health would benefit from the use of marijuana . . . .”
The Act serves two traditional state interests. First, it directly
governs health care practice as it exempts doctors from certain
state criminal laws relating to the illegal sale or cultivation of
322
marijuana.
It has also traditionally been within a state’s
prerogative to experiment with new methods of treating disease
323
and illness, similar to previous state practices with inoculation.
Other state medical marijuana laws also show an express
medical decision at work. For example, Maine’s medical marijuana
provision provides that “a person . . . may lawfully possess a usable
amount of marijuana for medical use if, at the time of that
possession, the person has available an authenticated copy of a
medical record or other written documentation from a physician”
324
demonstrating one of several enumerated medical conditions.
Maine medical marijuana patients would be engaging in the
325
possession of a “useable amount” of marijuana, for personal
medical use pursuant to “written documentation from a physician”
in conformity with state law, similar to the facts implicated in

320. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996) (illustrating the
purpose of the legislation).
321. Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A).
322. Id. § 11362.5(d).
323. See supra notes 201-204.
324. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2382-B(5) (1975).
325. Id. § 2382-B(3)(E) (“‘Usable amount of marijuana for medical use’ means
2 1/2 ounces or less of harvested marijuana and a total of 6 plants, of which no
more than 3 may be mature, flowering plants.”).
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326

Raich.
A finding that these types of programs are traditionally matters
of state concern would undercut the government’s assertion that
the broader regulatory scheme envisioned by the CSA covers the
“use of controlled substances for medical purposes and the role of
327
physicians in approving their use.”
The Court’s history of
rejecting such claims bodes well for state health care advocates. As
noted above, in Linder, for example, the Court refused to accept
that distribution of drugs to an addict fell outside the practice of
328
medicine.
A finding that many medical marijuana laws belong to a class
of traditional state functions does not necessarily remove all federal
regulatory power, and not just in Commerce Clause cases. The
spending clause could be used to encourage the states to oppose
medical marijuana programs. Additionally, entering into treaties,
329
such as the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
may
require federal intervention into areas traditionally governed by
330
the states.
However, a finding that the Single Convention
mandates that the CSA apply to state medical marijuana is
independent of whether a matter traditionally left to the states is
beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.
2.

Physician-Assisted Suicide

Like medical marijuana, activity performed in conformity with
statutes that permit physician-assisted suicide may be beyond the
reach of federal commerce power if the activity is found to be a
331
traditional state interest. Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act was
upheld by the Ninth Circuit after two citizen initiatives and a
332
lengthy battle in federal court. The law permits licensed Oregon
326. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2003). By contrast,
however, the California statute at issue in Raich exempted from prosecution
patients who possessed marijuana “for the personal medical purposes of the
patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.” Id. at
1225 (emphasis added) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West
1996)).
327. Petitioners’ Brief at 40, Raich (No. 03-1454).
328. 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
329. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407
(1967), 520 U.N.T.S. 151 (1964).
330. See Dupont Brief, supra note 301, at 10.
331. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2003).
332. See Scott Gast, Who Defines “Legitimate Medical Practice?” Lessons Learned from
the Controlled Substances Act, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Oregon v. Ashcroft, 10 VA.
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doctors to prescribe drugs to patients for use in ending their own
333
lives. Of course, however, the Controlled Substance Act regulates
the actual medications being prescribed. The CSA classifies drugs
based upon a determination by the Attorney General regarding
multiple factors relating to a substance’s medicinal and addictive
334
properties. It also allows the Attorney General to deny or revoke
a registration if he concludes the registration would be
335
“inconsistent with the public interest.”
In 2001, John Ashcroft issued an interpretive ruling that the
dispensing of controlled substances for the purposes of suicide was
inconsistent with the public interest and threatened to revoke the
registration of any practitioner that prescribed medications for
336
such purposes.
The ruling was immediately contested. The
District Court, and the Ninth Circuit on appeal, found that as
worded, the CSA did not authorize the Attorney General to decide
whether physician-assisted suicide is a permissible medical
337
practice.
Because the federal policy at issue was based on an
interpretive ruling, the underlying legal standard is much different
than Raich, and neither court considered whether Congress had
the authority under the commerce clause to prevent physician338
assisted suicide over a validly enacted state law.
Despite these
differences, the question of health care as a traditional state
concern is quite similar in each case.
The Supreme Court has also implied that physician-assisted
suicide implicates the traditional state health concern. Justice
O’Connor noted in Washington v. Glucksberg, “States are presently
undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of physician-assisted
suicide and other related issues,” and will act as “laboratories” for
339
constructing safe and humane policies.
O’Connor’s statement
rings of a strong constitutional preference for deferring to state
legislatures. While the Death with Dignity Act is an assertion of a
traditional state power, it may not be controlled directly by the

J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 261, 261-63 (2002).
333. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800 (2003).
334. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2004).
335. Id. § 823(f).
336. Gast, supra note 332, at 262.
337. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088-89 (D. Or. 2002), rev’d,
368 F.3d 1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2004).
338. See Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1125.
339. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O’Connor J.,
concurring).
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outcome in Raich, in that it does not equally involve the
distribution of marketing of medicines—an accepted federal
function.
For instance, the Act does not set out a single particular
purpose or define its function other than through piecing together
340
multiple sections.
Nor does it alter the federal requirements for
obtaining prescription drugs. It specifies only the procedures that
must be followed, in addition to those required by the CSA, by any
medical practitioner prescribing lawfully available medications for
341
the purpose of ending a life.
Although the Act does not define its purpose, Oregon has
asserted that the law “‘establish[es] and enforce[s] standards of
342
conduct within its borders relative to everyone there.’” While the
explicit interference with the Act by Congress would present
unique Commerce Clause concerns, in the current legal dispute
the traditional state interest analysis and arguments are largely
343
similar to those in Raich.
As in the medical marijuana context,
the federal government’s argument in Oregon v. Ashcroft would
largely permit the federal government to declare what is an
appropriate medical purpose even if a state disagrees with the
344
determination. A finding that regulation of the activity in Raich is
traditionally left to the states would give greater force to Oregon’s
argument that the proper federal role is regulating the traffic and
safety of particular substances, not interpreting whether those
substances should be lawfully prescribed to particular patients.
3.

Stem Cell Research and Human Cloning

“Human life is a creation of God - not a commodity to be
exploited by man,” said President George W. Bush, discussing stem
345
cells in Dallas before the Texas Knights of Columbus convention.
Rarely has the stem cell debate been publicly phrased in terms of
340. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-.897 (2003).
341. Id.
342. Appellee’s Brief of the State of Oregon at 20, Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F.
Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2000) (No. 3:0101647) (quoting Barsky v. Bd. of Regents,
347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954)).
343. See Brief for Appellants at II.C., Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077
(D. Or. 2000) (No. 02-35587).
344. Id.
345. Ken Fireman, Election 2004: On the Conservative Side Vying for Catholic Vote,
Bush Reiterates Views and Promises More Funding for Religious Charities, NEWSDAY, Aug.
4, 2004, at A18.
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commerce, rather than medicine or public health. But the federal
commerce power, however, could play a significant role in the
future legislation related to stem cells and human cloning.
In 2001, the House of Representatives passed the Human
346
Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 (HCPA). The Act specified that:
It shall be unlawful for any person or entity, public or
private, in or affecting interstate commerce, knowingly—
(1) to perform or attempt to perform human cloning; (2)
to participate in an attempt to perform human cloning; or
(3) to ship or receive for any purpose an embryo
produced by human cloning or any product derived from
347
such embryo.
The prohibition does not immediately come across as a
significant limitation on state health care practices. However, the
term “human cloning” was defined as “human asexual
reproduction, accomplished by introducing nuclear material from
one or more human somatic cells into a fertilized or unfertilized
oocyte whose nuclear material has been removed or inactivated so
as to produce a living organism (at any stage of development) . . .
348
349
.” This is an incredibly broad definition. The inclusion of the
qualifier “(at any stage of development)” would necessarily include
the point immediately after a human cell is duplicated. Such a
broad definition implicates another line of medicinal policy that is
not instantly apparent from the title of the Act—stem cell research.
Cloning and stem cell research actually share a common
scientific base. Both practices often implement a practice called
350
somatic cell nuclear transplantation or transfer (SCNT).
The
cloning procedure for much stem cell research and direct human
cloning “is identical up to the point where a blastocyte created
through SCNT is either implanted into a woman’s uterus
(reproductive cloning) or used as a source of stem cells (research
351
cloning).” If passed, the HCPA would prevent both reproductive
346. H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001); see Jonathan S. Schwartz, The Human
Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001: Vagueness and Federalism, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 79, 81-82
(2002).
347. H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302) (2001).
348. H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301(1)).
349. See Schwartz, supra note 346, at 82-83.
350. Charity Schiller, Comment, Stem Cell Research and Conditional Federal
Funding: Do State Laws Allowing More Extensive Research Pose a Problem for Federalism?,
31 PEPP. L. REV. 1017, 1027 (2004).
351. Alexander Morgan Carpron, Placing a Moratorium on Research Cloning to
Ensure Effective Control over Reproductive Cloning, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1057, 1061 (2002).
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and research cloning.
In November of 2004, California voters approved Proposition
71, the California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act (Stem Cell
352
Act).
The Act in part, amends the California Constitution to
create an Institute for Regenerative Medicine that has the authority
353
to fund SCNT stem cell production for research purposes.
The
motivation behind the Act cannot be any clearer. It is designed to:
“Maximize the use of research funds by giving priority to stem cell
research that has the greatest potential for therapies and cures,
specifically focused on . . . vital research opportunities that cannot,
or are unlikely to receive timely or sufficient federal funding . . .
354
.”
New Jersey also permits the use of SCNT research, but
expressly prohibits the sale, transfer, or exchange of stem cell
355
New Jersey has
products for any “valuable consideration.”
removed the commercial nature of the research and resigned the
356
issue to purely medical bases.
However, members of Congress continue to introduce the
HCPA with the intent to prevent the type of research expressly
357
provided for by New Jersey and California Law.
The supporters
of HCPA find authority under the “Public Health Services Act,
[PHSA] which gives the FDA the power to regulate ‘biological
358
products’ that are used to treat medical conditions.”
The FDA
has also stated that human cloning falls within the definition of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act because the cloned cells can be
359
defined as a drug. Further, “drugs” are defined as “articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the
360
body.”
We are not going to assess whether this interpretation of the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is correct, but the opposing positions
put forth by New Jersey and California will assuredly spark legal
challenge if the federal ban becomes law. More important for our
352. Stem Cell Research and Cures Act, at http://www.curesforcalifornia.
com/initiative.php [hereinafter Stem Cell Act] (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
353. Id. § 4 sec. 3.
354. Id. § 3 ¶ 2.
355. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2Z-1 to -2(c)(1) (West 2004).
356. See id.
357. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th Cong.
(2003); S. 245, 108th Cong. (2003).
358. H.R. REP. NO. 108-18, at 3 (2004), (Report from the House Committee on
the Judiciary on the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003).
359. Id.
360. Id.
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analysis is whether the act of using SCNT technology to clone a cell
is a health care function. California and New Jersey’s laws could
not be more attuned to an area of traditional state concern. In
both cases the law’s purpose is to research and develop treatments
and cures for disease, the most traditional area of state health care
361
regulation. The HCPA would intrude into a pure research arena,
an area we have shown to be within a state’s traditional function.
The actual language of the PHSA requires that drugs must be
362
“used to treat medical conditions.” The Supreme Court noted in
363
Jones v. United States that because the words “used . . . in an activity
affecting interstate . . . commerce” appeared in a federal arson
statute, the word “used” must mean something directly commercial
364
in nature.
Otherwise, the distinction between federal and state
365
concerns would be lost.
Although Jones involved an issue of statutory interpretation, the
Court might have followed this route to avoid having to find the
statute unconstitutional for intruding too broadly into traditional
366
state activities. Likewise, in the context of human cloning, the act
of cloning itself is akin to a surgical procedure, a medical practice
that appears to be a purely traditional state activity. To permit a
broad reach into all aspects of cloning, regardless of the program’s
design, purpose, or methods of implementation, would be to
curtail a state’s ability to research solutions to state wide medical
problems or dictate the tenets of its own medical practice. This
reading accepts the need for the national uniform distribution and
control of medicines, but it reserves states the traditional right to
engage in medical experimentation.
Extending the theory
underlying the Jones decision to human cloning provides courts
with a clear dividing line between traditionally local and
traditionally federal concerns.
However, even if such a result occurred, a determined
Congress or Executive might still be able to prevent states from
361. See supra Part III.
362. H.R. REP. NO. 108-18, at 2 (2004).
363. 529 U.S. 848, 856-58 (2000); see also Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171-75 (2001) (limiting the definition of § 404(a) of
the Clean Water Act because an expansive definition would intrude too broadly
into intrastate activities).
364. Id. at 857-58.
365. Id. at 854 (finding that “used” meant the arson statute only applied to
commercial buildings).
366. See Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 573, 585 (2004).
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engaging in stem cell research. In 2004, President Bush began a
push in the United Nations to enter into a treaty banning stem cell
367
research and human cloning.
Although most nations seem to
oppose such a position, (even close allies of the United States) a
treaty could effectively prevent state experimentation, regardless of
368
how traditional the activity may be.
If the election of 2004 is prescient in any way, then the stem
cell and cloning debate will only increase in the coming years.
Religious conservatives will almost surely continue to push for
passage of the HCPA or similar laws. Other states may also join
California and New Jersey in directly funding, or at a minimum,
permitting research cloning.
4.

Abortion

The abortion debate’s relationship to Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is twofold. First, whether the practice is a matter of
traditional state concern, and second, if it is, whether the right to
369
an abortion pursuant to Roe v. Wade will be affected by the
greater state protection such a determination may afford. In
addressing the first point, it is hard to deny that performing an
abortion is a medical act. While it may also be part of a doctor’s
employment, the act itself involves medical decisions.
The
examination of current federal attempts to restrict abortion
370
rights exhibits how a finding that the act of performing an
abortion is within the sphere of traditional state power affects the
availability and right to the procedure.
Congress has generally not opted to involve itself in the
abortion debate through direct regulation. Rather, it has used its
spending power to influence state and private actions, mostly
371
geared towards restricting abortion access.
However, in 2003,
367. See Maggie Farley, U.S. Campaigns for Treaty to Ban Use of Embryo Stem Cells;
Bush administration's proposal would prohibit human and therapeutic cloning for medical
research. World body is divided on the issue, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at A3.
368. Id. (“Nearly 130 nations, including close U.S. allies such as Britain, Japan
and India, say that each nation should be allowed to decide for itself whether to
regulate therapeutic cloning.”). See also U.S. CONST. art. II § 2; Dupont Brief, supra
note 301, at 15-18 (showing how a U.N. treaty may require Congress to pass
legislation curtailing areas traditionally within the ambit of state sovereignty).
369. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
370. See, e.g., Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub L. No. 108-105 (117
Stat.) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2004)).
371. See Harris v. McRea, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the denial of
Medicaid funds for abortions); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding a

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/7

48

Kreit and Marcus: Raich, Health Care, and the Commerce Clause
7KREITMARCUS.DOC

2005]

3/13/2005 4:08:28 PM

RAICH, HEALTH CARE, COMMERCE CLAUSE

1005

President Bush signed into law the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
372
Worded similarly to the HCPA, the ban prohibits
(PBABA).
“[a]ny physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and
thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or
373
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.” Three United States
District Courts in the summer of 2004 found the Act
374
None of these courts addressed
unconstitutional as written.
Congress’ power to enact the law, despite one court even authoring
375
a 173-page memorandum.
Instead, the law has been found
376
invalid under Stenberg v. Carhart because it fails to provide an
377
adequate exception for the health of the mother.
If the PBABA was challenged on Commerce Clause grounds,
Professor Allan Ides has argued that the Court would be hard
pressed to find the Act does not invade a traditional state
378
function.
Not only does the PBABA parallel the wording of the
379
HCPA, both laws seek to criminalize the performance of an act:
there, “human cloning,” and here, performing an abortion. As
Professor Ides points out, it is also nearly identical to the VAWA,
380
ruled unconstitutional in Morrison.
The VAWA involved solely
“an act of gender-based violence [and] is in no way dependent on
381
the presence of a commercial transaction.”
The PBABA stands on equal footing with Congress’ attempts to
prevent human cloning and violence against women. None of the
acts necessarily require the exchange of goods or services or some
other economic transaction that generally invokes the need for
382
national action.
The mere act of performing an abortion is
prohibition on the distribution of abortion related information by federally
funded clinics).
372. Pub L. 108-105 (117 Stat.) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2004)).
373. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a)).
374. See Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (D. Neb. 2004); Nat’l
Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Planned
Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
375. Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 805.
376. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
377. See Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
378. Allan Ides, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 and the Commerce
Clause, 20 CONST. COMMENT 441, 451 (2003).
379. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 108-18, at 2.
380. See Ides, supra note 378.
381. Id. at 446.
382. See supra notes 306-311 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction
between needs giving rise to federal action and matters of traditional state
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independent of any broader federal regulatory authority. It is a
medical function and is unrelated to any function beyond the
regulation of medical care. The decision to perform an abortion is
a complex medical decision regarding the safety of the mother, the
stage of fetal development, as well as other mental and physical
383
health concerns.
These decisions have been and may remain
with state authorities if the Court is serious about applying the
traditional state interest doctrine.
With respect to state laws restricting abortion, a number of
scholars have expressed concern that a strong states right’s position
could allow states to prohibit abortion and eviscerate nationally
protected rights. Professor Marc Spindelman argues that although
abortion is a constitutionally protected right, the Raich and Oregon
v. Ashcroft “line of judicial thinking about states’ rights . . . is
eminently capable of uprooting and overturning constitutional
384
rights [that] the Court has recognized.” Specifically, Spindelman
is concerned that courts will accept abortion as being within a
traditional area of state health care concern and thus, be hesitant
to restrict states from expanding or contracting the practice as they
385
see fit.
Without analyzing the issues in depth, it seems unlikely
that the traditional state interest determination will allow states to
pass laws that violate the Constitution. The individual liberties
expounded in the Constitution’s amendments are designed to
prevent state interference with individual rights, even in areas
386
traditionally left to the states.
The central debate in Raich that federal authorities cannot
interfere with non-economic exclusively state functions does not
give a state free reign to then interfere with rights granted under
the Constitution. In fact, respecting federalism may actually
enhance federal authority to enforce the individual protections the
Constitution provides. Comity entails a respect for the separate
spheres of power. When those boundaries are more carefully

concern).
383. See Hutton Brown et al., Special Project: Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding
Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597 (1986).
384. Marc Spindelman, A Dissent from the Many Dissents from Attorney General John
Ashcroft’s Interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act, 19 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 36-37
(2003) (quoting Marc Spindelman, Protecting Suicide and Hurting Women, LEGAL
TIMES, May 27, 2002, at 51).
385. Id.
386. See generally 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 388 (discussing the basic
function of a bill of rights).
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patrolled, the intrusion of one sovereign into the realm of the
other commences only when necessary, not simply when desired.
Limiting federal authority in commerce cases will reduce the
overlap between state and federal regulations. Thus, when
Congress acts pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to protect the rights of United States citizens, Congress will more
clearly be viewed as acting as a protectorate instead of just a policy
maker.
V. CONCLUSION
Just what qualifies as a traditional state interest is unclear. The
determination will depend, at least in part, on the manner in which
the activity at issue is classified. However, independent of these
aspects of Commerce Clause analysis, Raich has the potential to
significantly impact health care by clarifying the extent to which
the field is a traditional state concern in the midst of increasing
federal involvement. Although it is possible that the Court may
resolve Raich without a significant discussion of the relationship
between state and federal authority over health care, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Oregon v. Ashcroft indicates that the issue will
continue to be important, whatever the outcome of Raich. As our
discussion and analysis of the history of federal and state health
care regulation reveals, a framework which distinguishes regulation
of the doctor and patient relationship from regulation of the safety
of prescription drugs or federal benefits spending may prove the
most consistent with the historical understanding of the state’s
traditional role in health care.
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